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In	 1967,	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court	 held	 that	 youth	were	
entitled	 to	 an	 array	 of	 procedural	 safeguards,	 including	 the	 right	 to	
counsel,	during	juvenile	delinquency	proceedings.1	With	its	In	re	Gault	
decision,	the	Supreme	Court	ushered	in	the	“due	process	era”	of	juvenile	
justice	 in	America,2	beginning	what	 some	have	called	a	 “revolution	 in	
children’s	 rights.”3	 However,	 members	 of	 the	 Gault	 Court	 and	
proponents	of	the	decision	in	its	day	would	be	disappointed	by	the	state	
of	juvenile	justice	in	America	today.	Despite	the	Gault	Court’s	declaration	
that	 children	 who	 face	 a	 loss	 of	 liberty	 deserve	 fundamental	
constitutional	protections,4	youth	 in	 the	criminal	 justice	system	today	
are	more	vulnerable	than	ever.	
With	 police	 in	 schools	 and	 zero-tolerance	 policies	 on	 the	 books,	
youth	can	easily	come	into	contact	with	law	enforcement	and	be	shunted	
into	the	criminal	justice	system.5	Once	there,	many	young	people	do	not	
have	 legal	 representation	 even	when	 they	 are	 entitled	 to	 it.6	 And	 for	
youth	accused	of	a	crime,	the	stakes	are	incredibly	high.	Youth	in	every	
state	 can	 be	 transferred	 to	 adult	 court	 and	 charged	 as	 if	 they	 were	
adults.7	 In	 adult	 court,	 juveniles	 are	 subject	 to	mandatory	minimums	
that	 were	 drafted	 with	 adults	 in	 mind.8	 Youth	 can	 be	 held	 in	 adult	
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abolished	 juvenile	 execution	 in	 2005,	 the	 United	 States	 is	 the	 only	
developed	nation	in	the	world	that	sentences	children	to	die	in	prison.10	
In	 short,	 the	United	 States	waged	a	war	on	kids	 in	 the	 late-twentieth	
century,	and	the	rights	announced	in	Gault	could	not	contain	that	war. 
This	 Article	 proceeds	 in	 three	 Parts.	 Part	 II	 discusses	 the	 Gault	
opinion	and	its	significance	in	1967.	Part	III	argues	that	Gault	has	never	
been	 fully	 implemented	 and	 offers	 two	 explanations	 for	 its	 stunted	
application,	neither	of	which	was	within	the	Gault	Court’s	control.	First,	
as	 a	 function	 of	 institutional	 design,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	was	 not	 in	 a	
position	to	change	the	landscape	of	juvenile	justice	in	a	meaningful	way.	












opinion	 does	 not	 include	 the	 content	 of	 Gault’s	 alleged	 remarks,	 but	
Justice	 Fortas	 described	 them	 as	 being	 “of	 the	 irritatingly	 offensive,	
adolescent,	 sex	 variety.”13	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 accusation,	 police	 picked	





	 12.	 Prank	 phone	 calls	 have	 been	 around	 almost	 as	 long	 as	 the	 telephone,	 and	 for	 most	
adolescents	prank	phone	calls	are	a	harmless,	if	annoying,	rite	of	passage.	See	Julie	Beck,	The	Long	






















and	 acknowledged	 its	 important	 and	 even	 laudable	 history.18	 First	
established	 in	 Illinois	 in	 1899,	 early	 juvenile	 courts	 shared	 several	
defining	 features:	 informality,	 wide	 judicial	 discretion,	 and	 most	
importantly,	a	fundamental	belief	that	a	child	accused	of	a	crime	was	in	
need	of	social	rehabilitation,	rather	than	punishment	for	its	own	sake.19	




why	he	did	 it	 .	.	.	.”21	 In	 this	 context,	 rules	of	 criminal	procedure	were	
seen	as	both	irrelevant	and	counterproductive.	
However,	 as	 the	 Gault	 Court	 concluded,	 by	 the	 mid-twentieth	
century,	juvenile	courts	across	the	country	had	strayed	from	the	ideals	

















judges.23	 Gerald	 Gault’s	 experience	 proved	 this	 point	 well.	 Gault	 had	
engaged	in	normal	adolescent	behavior,	and	to	the	extent	that	his	actions	
were	criminal,	they	were	fairly	minor.24	In	fact,	his	conduct	was	entirely	
consistent	 with	 what	 today’s	 neuroscience	 tells	 us	 about	 adolescent	
crime.25	Adolescent	crimes	are	often	a	function	of	group	conduct	where	








not	 enjoy	 the	 solicitude	 of	 a	 judge	 who	 was	 looking	 to	 ensure	 his	
wellbeing	 and	 growth.31	 Had	 Gault	 been	 an	 adult	 at	 the	 time	 of	 his	
conviction,	he	would	have	faced	a	maximum	fine	of	fifty	dollars	or	two	
months	 imprisonment.32	 Instead,	 he	 was	 sentenced	 to	 six	 years	
confinement.33	
Reviewing	a	petition	for	habeas	corpus	filed	by	Gault’s	parents,	the	
Supreme	 Court	 recognized	 the	 absurdity	 of	 this	 outcome.34	 Justice	
Fortas	wrote	that	“[u]nder	our	Constitution,	the	condition	of	being	a	boy	
does	not	justify	a	kangaroo	court.”35	And	the	Court	held	that	juveniles	in	
delinquency	 proceedings	 are	 entitled	 to	 basic	 procedural	 safeguards:	






	 26.	 Id.	at	24–27	(discussing	the	 link	between	adolescent	susceptibility	 to	peer	pressure	and	
crime).	






387	U.S.	at	28	 (“[O]ne	would	assume	 that	 in	a	 case	 like	 that	of	Gerald	Gault,	where	 the	 juvenile	
appears	 to	have	a	home,	a	working	mother	and	 father,	 and	an	older	brother,	 the	 Juvenile	 Judge	









confrontation	 and	 cross-examination	 of	 witnesses,	 and	 the	 right	 of	
privilege	 against	 self-incrimination.36	 The	 Court	 acknowledged	 that	 if	




In	 its	 day,	 Gault	 was	 promising—arguably	 revolutionary—in	 at	
least	 two	 respects.	 First,	 the	 Gault	 Court	 recognized	 children	 as	
independent	beings	with	affirmative	legal	rights	of	their	own,	and	this	
was	still	a	novel	concept	in	1967.39	Prior	to	Gault,	juvenile	delinquency	
proceedings	were	 treated	as	civil	proceedings	because	 it	was	 thought	
that	 children	had	a	 right	not	 to	 liberty,	 but	 rather	 to	 custody—either	
with	parents	or	the	state.40	In	that	context,	when	liberty	was	taken	away,	






states	 accountable	 for	 their	 inequitable	 and	 often	 draconian	 criminal	
justice	 practices.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 Court	 formally	 recognized	 the	
fundamental	unfairness	in	asking	individuals	to	confront	the	awesome	
power	 of	 the	 state	 on	 their	 own	 when	 they	 faced	 a	 loss	 of	 liberty.43	




	 38.	 Id.	at	29–30	(“So	wide	a	gulf	between	the	State’s	 treatment	of	 the	adult	and	of	 the	child	
requires	 a	 bridge	 sturdier	 than	 mere	 verbiage,	 and	 reasons	 more	 persuasive	 than	 cliché	 can	











	 43.	 See,	e.g.,	 id.	at	344	(“[I]n	our	adversary	system	of	criminal	 justice,	any	person	haled	into	
court,	who	is	too	poor	to	hire	a	lawyer,	cannot	be	assured	a	fair	trial	unless	counsel	is	provided	for	




implemented	 on	 the	 ground,44	 both	 were	 still	 watershed	 decisions.	
Gideon	 and	Gault	 required	 the	 states	 to	 begin	 the	 project	 of	 securing	
representation	 for	 poor	 adults	 and	 children	 accused	 of	 a	 crime.45	
Moreover,	 by	 granting	 poor	 criminal	 defendants	 formal	 procedural	
protections,	 the	 Court	 armed	 those	 individuals	 with	 a	 new	 oversight	
mechanism:	 constitutional	 claims	 in	 federal	 court	 when	 those	
protections	were	denied.46	
In	sum,	the	Gault	decision	was	profound	in	its	day,	and	it	ushered	in	
a	 new	 era	 of	 formal	 protections	 for	 juvenile	 defendants.	However,	 as	




Gault	has	never	been	 fully	 implemented,	and	 this	Part	offers	 two	
explanations	for	its	stunted	application,	neither	of	which	the	Gault	Court	
could	 have	 prevented.	 First,	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 institutional	 design,	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 was	 never	 in	 a	 position	 to	 significantly	 improve	 the	
juvenile	 justice	 concerns	 illuminated	 in	 Gault.	 Second,	 fear-driven	





would	 be	 disappointed	 to	 learn	 of	 Gault’s	 legacy.	 Studies	 of	 juvenile	
defense	 have	 consistently	 concluded	 that	 Gault	 has	 never	 been	 fully	






NAT’L	 RIGHT	 TO	 COUNSEL	 COMM.,	 THE	 CONSTITUTION	 PROJECT,	 Justice	 Denied	 2	 (2009),	 https://
constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf	 (describing	 ongoing	 failure	 of	















children	 a	 lawyer	 regardless	 of	 financial	 status,51	 and	 in	 all	 other	
jurisdictions	 financial	 eligibility	 must	 be	 resolved	 on	 a	 case-by-case	
basis	before	the	child	receives	representation.52	As	the	report	explains,	
this	 eligibility	 inquiry	 is	 problematic	 in	 several	 respects.	 It	 can	 delay	
representation,	sometimes	requiring	the	child	to	be	detained	without	a	
lawyer	in	the	process;	it	can	intimidate	the	family	and	prompt	a	child	to	




investigation;54	 thirty-six	 states	 allow	 children	 to	 be	 charged	 fees	 for	




Meanwhile,	 the	 stakes	 have	 never	 been	 higher	 for	 juvenile	
defendants.	Young	people	can	be	charged	in	adult	court	far	too	easily	and	
frequently;	they	can	be	subject	to	extreme	sentences;	they	can	be	housed	
in	 adult	 facilities;	 and	 their	 chances	 of	 successful	 rehabilitation	 and	
	
	 48.	 AM.	BAR.	ASS’N.,	JUVENILE	JUSTICE	CENTER,	A	Call	for	Justice:	An	Assessment	of	Access	to	Counsel	





















for	 justice-involved	 youth	 has	 garnered	 attention	 and	 prompted	
innovative	forms	of	activism	in	recent	years.60	
For	example,	in	2015,	the	federal	government	filed	a	Statement	of	
Interest	 (Statement)	 in	 a	 class-action	 lawsuit	 challenging	 the	
deprivation	 of	 counsel	 for	 youth	 in	 Georgia.61	 The	 Statement	 was	 an	
attempt	 to	 inform	 the	 state	 court’s	 analysis	 of	 children’s	 due	process	
rights	 as	 articulated	 in	 Gault,	 and	 it	 was	 the	 first	 such	 filing	 by	 the	









In	 short,	 while	 the	 Gault	 decision	 triggered	 formal	 rights	 for	
children	 accused	 of	 crimes	 across	 the	 country,	 those	 rights	 still	 have	

















	 64.	 Craig	Dray,	Players	Coalition	Holds	First	Press	Conference	at	 Super	Bowl	LIII,	 PRO	PLAYER	
INSIDERS	 (Jan.	 30,	 2019),	 http://proplayerinsiders.com/nfl-player-team-news-features/players-
coalition-holds-first-press-conference-super-bowl-liii/.	
	 65.	 The	Coalition	regularly	advocates	for	juvenile	justice	reform	by	tweeting	about	the	issue,	
including	 the	 specific	 issue	of	deprivation	of	 the	 right	 to	 counsel.	See,	e.g.,	Nat’l	 Football	 League	
Players	 Coal.,	 TWITTER	 (May	 25,	 2019,	 2:32	 PM),	 https://twitter.com/playercoalition/status/	
1132399067361730560.	
2020]	 In	Re	Gault	at	50	 441	





As	 scholars	 have	 discussed	 at	 length,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 can	
participate	in	social	change,	but	not	in	isolation.66	Rather,	advocates	of	
social	change	often	obtain	confirmation	of	rights	from	the	Court,	while	
implementation	 of	 those	 rights	 falls	 to	 the	 executive	 and	 legislative	
branches—frequently	 at	 the	 state	 level.67	 As	 a	 result,	 rights	 as	
announced	by	the	Court	often	go	unfulfilled,68	and	the	right	to	counsel	
demonstrates	this	principle	well.	In	1963,	the	Supreme	Court	announced	
that	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 grants	 individuals	 the	 right	 to	 counsel	 in	
criminal	cases	at	the	state’s	expense.69	More	than	fifty	years	after	that	






an	 adequate	 accounting	 of	 indigent	 defense	 services,	 let	 alone	 an	
assessment	of	 their	 efficacy.72	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 indigent	defense	has	






1616	 (1992)	 (reviewing	 HOLLOW	 HOPE);	 Mark	 Tushnet,	 Some	 Legacies	 of	 Brown	 v.	 Board	 of	
Education,	 90	 VA.	L.	REV.	 1693,	 1712	 (2004)	 (suggesting	 that	 the	 Court	 can	 articulate	 powerful	
principles	of	social	reform	despite	constraints	imposed	on	the	judicial	branch).	
	 67.	 See	Powe,	supra	note	66,	at	1622.	















has	been	 true	 for	 the	 right	 to	 counsel	 for	 youth	 accused	of	 a	 crime.74	







associated	 with	 that	 trend,76	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Gault	 decision	 the	
nationwide	 jail	 and	 prison	 population	was	 still	 below	 300,000.77	 But	
between	 1960	 and	 the	 mid-1990s,	 violent	 crime	 rose	 consistently,	
reaching	an	all-time	peak	in	1991.78	The	War	on	Drugs	was	ushered	in,	
and	 lawmakers	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 aisle	 embraced	 tough-on-crime	
political	 positions,	 putting	 more	 crimes	 on	 the	 books,	 enhancing	 the	
penalties	for	crimes,	and	rewarding	prosecutors	for	tough	sanctions.79	
















on	 Drugs	 and	 mandatory	 minimums	 drove	 mass	 incarceration	 and	 arguing	 that	 prosecutorial	
discretion	is	largely	to	blame).	
	 76.	 Lauren-Brooke	Eisen	&	Oliver	Roeder,	America’s	Faulty	Perception	of	Crime	Rates,	BRENNAN	














Youth	 suffered	 from	 the	 trend	 toward	 mass	 incarceration,	 too.	
While	 states	 failed	 to	 fully	 implement	 Gault,	 they	 simultaneously	
implemented	laws	and	policies	that	made	children	more	vulnerable	than	
ever	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.82	 As	 I	 have	 argued	 more	 fully	
elsewhere,	a	few	legislative	decisions	of	the	late-twentieth	century	were	












ways,	making	 it	easier	 for	children	 to	be	prosecuted	 in	adult	criminal	
court.87	Some	state	laws	reduced	the	age	at	which	a	juvenile	judge	was	
authorized	 to	 transfer	 a	 child	 to	 adult	 court,	 while	 other	 state	 laws	
automatically	 excluded	 certain	 juvenile	 defendants	 from	 the	 juvenile	
court’s	jurisdiction	based	upon	the	child’s	age	or	the	charged	offense.88	
Finally,	 some	 states	 amended	 their	 laws	 to	 vest	 the	 prosecutor	 with	
unilateral	authority	to	make	the	juvenile	transfer	decision.89	
	


















case	 into	 adult	 court,	 and	most	 states	have	 several.90	 In	 twenty-three	






adult	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 law	when	 accused	 of	 a	 crime,	 and	 they	 have	
exposed	hundreds	of	thousands	of	children	to	the	adult	criminal	justice	
system.93	Unlike	the	juvenile	court’s	focus	on	rehabilitation,	“[t]he	adult	
criminal	 process	 is	 entirely	 adversarial,	 and	 incarceration	 is	 the	
common	 punishment.”94	 Even	 if	 the	 incarceration	 term	 is	 relatively	
short,	the	collateral	consequences	of	an	adult	criminal	conviction	can	be	
life-altering	 for	 anyone,	 let	 alone	 a	 minor.95	 For	 example,	 a	 child	
convicted	in	adult	court	may	be	required	to	register	as	a	sex-offender	for	
life,96	 and	 juvenile	 convictions	 in	 adult	 court	 can	 serve	 as	 prior	









	 91.	 Juveniles	 Tried	 as	 Adults,	 OFFICE	 OF	 JUVENILE	 JUSTICE	 AND	DELINQUENCY	PREVENTION	 (2016),	
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04105.asp.	
	 92.	 Griffin	et	al.,	supra	note	90,	at	3.	








increasing	 the	 risk	 of	 recidivism.	Criminal	 convictions	 can	 limit	 access	 to	 driver’s	 licenses	 and	
prevent	youth	from	voting	or	holding	public	office.”).	
	 96.	 Amy	 E.	 Halbrook,	 Juvenile	 Pariahs,	 65	 HASTINGS	L.J.	 1,	 5	 (2013)	 (“In	 some	 jurisdictions,	
lifetime	juvenile	sex	offender	registration	is	mandatory	for	certain	offenses.”).	






federal	 government	 and	 the	 states	 introduced	 increasingly	 punitive	
sentencing	 schemes,	 including	 mandatory	 minimum	 sentences.98	 The	
convergence	of	 these	 two	developments	meant	 that	by	 the	end	of	 the	
twentieth	 century,	 children	 could	 easily	be	prosecuted	 in	 adult	 court,	
and	 in	adult	court,	 they	could	be	subjected	to	harsh,	often	mandatory	
sentences—sentences	 that	 refused	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 mitigating	
aspects	 of	 youth.99	 As	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 recently	
acknowledged,	 imposing	 lengthy	sentences	on	minors,	especially	on	a	
mandatory	 basis,	 creates	 a	 fundamental	 unfairness.100	 First,	 a	 child	
sentenced	to	a	long	term	of	years	will	serve	a	much	greater	percentage	
of	 their	 life	 than	an	adult	who	 receives	 the	 same	sentence.101	 Second,	
lengthy	mandatory	sentences	ignore	the	scientific	fact	that	children	are	
both	 less	 culpable	 and	more	 amenable	 to	 rehabilitation	 over	 time.102	
Because	of	 this	science,	 in	recent	years	at	 least	two	jurisdictions	have	
outlawed	 the	 application	 of	mandatory	minimums	 to	 justice-involved	
youth.103	
c.	School-to-Prison	Pipeline	
By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 nation	 had	 embraced	
extreme	 juvenile	 justice	 practices,	 and	 the	 idea	 that	 youth	 were	



















threat-of-90s.html?_r=0.	 DiIulio	was	wrong,	 and	 he	 later	 admitted	 as	much;	 between	 1994	 and	







and	 gates,	 but	 also	 surveillance	 cameras,	 metal	 detectors,	 and	 drug-
sniffing	dogs.106	The	most	visible	part	of	this	trend	was	the	introduction	
of	 security	 personnel	 inside	 schools,	 often	 police	 officers	 or	 school	
resource	officers	(SROs).107	At	the	same	time,	schools	across	the	nation	
adopted	 “zero-tolerance”	 school	 discipline	 policies—essentially	
mandatory	minimums	 in	 the	 school	 setting.108	 These	 policies	 involve	
predetermined	consequences	for	infractions,	are	usually	harsh,	and	do	
not	take	into	account	context	or	potentially	mitigating	variables.109	










State	 laws	 and	 school	 district	 policies	 required	 that	 schools	 refer	
student	misbehavior	in	schools	to	law	enforcement.	Broad	criminal	
laws—such	as	those	criminalizing	any	behavior	which	amounted	to	
“disturbing	 schools”—rendered	 a	 large	 swath	 of	 adolescent	
misbehavior	 criminal.	 In	 combination	 with	 these	 policies,	 SROs’	
increased	 presence	 and	 involvement	 in	 school	 discipline	 led	 to	 a	
sharp	increase	in	arrests	for	incidents	arising	at	school.113	
	
















were	 nothing	 short	 of	 a	 war	 on	 kids,	 and	 the	 results	 have	 been	
devastating,	 especially	 for	 poor	 minority	 youth.	 Today,	 every	




with	 adults	 in	 mind.116	 Youth	 can	 be	 housed	 in	 adult	 correctional	
facilities,	 despite	 being	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 to	 physical	 and	 sexual	
assault	 in	 those	 locations.117	 Youth	 endure	 conditions	 of	 confinement	
that	we	 once	 thought	 appropriate	 for	 only	 the	most	 dangerous	 adult	




Moreover,	 as	 is	 true	 in	 the	 adult	 system,	 the	 nation’s	 extreme	
juvenile	 practices	 have	 had	 a	 disproportionate	 impact	 on	 poor	 and	
minority	youth.121	Black	youth	are	more	 than	 twice	as	 likely	as	white	
youth	 to	 be	 arrested,122	 and	 even	 as	 overall	 youth	 detention	 rates	
continue	to	decline,	black	youth	are	five	times	as	likely	as	white	youth	to	
	

















	 120.	 Josh	 Rovner,	 Juvenile	 Life	Without	 Parole:	 An	 Overview,	 THE	SENTENCING	PROJECT	 (2019),	
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/.	
	 121.	 Rudolph	Alexander,	 Jr.,	The	 Impact	 of	 Poverty	 on	 African	 American	 Children	 in	 the	 Child	
Welfare	 and	 Juvenile	 Justice	 Systems,	 4	 FORUM	 ON	 PUB.	 POLICY	 ONLINE	 1	 (2010),	
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ913052.pdf.	




be	 detained.123	 Similarly,	 poverty	 shunts	 children	 into	 detention	who	
would	never	 be	 there	 if	 they	had	 the	 financial	 resources	 to	 pay	 for	 a	






Reflecting	 on	Gault	 and	 its	 legacy	 today	 is	 instructive,	 especially	






offers	 some	 suggestions	 for	 how	 juvenile	 justice	 advocates	 might	




has	 limited	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 states	 can	 subject	 children	 to	 the	
harshest	sentences	on	the	books.128	In	2005,	the	Supreme	Court	held	in	
Roper	v.	Simmons	that	the	Constitution	forbids	execution	of	those	who	
commit	 homicide	 prior	 to	 the	 age	 of	 eighteen.129	 Relying	 upon	
longstanding	 Eighth	 Amendment	 methodology,	 the	 Court	 examined	
youth	 as	 a	 group	 and	 analyzed	 whether	 execution	 of	 minors	 was	
	










at	 84–96;	Cara	H.	 Drinan,	 The	Miller	 Revolution,	 101	 IOWA	L.	REV.	 1787	 (2016);	 Cara	H.	 Drinan,	




proportionate	 given	 their	 diminished	 culpability	 and	 greater	 capacity	
for	 rehabilitation.130	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Court	 looked	 at	 legislative	
trends	regarding	juvenile	execution	and	exercised	its	own	judgment	to	
rule	 that	 the	 practice	 violated	 evolving	 standards	 of	 decency.131	 Five	
years	 later,	 in	 Graham	 v.	 Florida,	 the	 Court	 again	 relied	 upon	







the	 minor’s	 home,	 educational,	 mental,	 physical,	 and	 social	
environments	 in	 order	 to	 make	 that	 determination.134	 Finally,	 in	
Montgomery	 v.	 Louisiana,	 the	 Court	 held	 that	 its	Miller	 decision	 was	
retroactively	applicable,	 and	with	 its	decision,	 thousands	of	prisoners	
nationwide	became	eligible	for	a	resentencing	or	parole	hearing.135	
These	decisions	reflect	 the	 lessons	of	neuroscience—science	 that	
confirms	 what	 “any	 parent	 knows.”136	 This	 science	 tells	 us	 that	 the	
frontal	 lobe	 of	 the	 brain	 controls	 functions	 like	 risk	 assessment	 and	
judgment;	that	the	brain	is	still	maturing	well	into	late	adolescence;	and,	
as	 a	 result,	 adolescents	 are	more	 subject	 to	 peer	 pressure	 than	 their	
adult	 counterparts,	 and	 they	 value	 short-term	 gain	 over	 long-term	
goals.137	 Because	 of	 their	 fleeting	 immaturity,	 children	 are	 both	 less	












sentenced	 to	mandatory	 JLWOP	 and	 became	 eligible	 for	 relief	 under	Montgomery.	 Josh	Rovner,	









In	 the	 last	 decade,	 advocates	 have	 leveraged	 these	 Eighth	
Amendment	 decisions	 to	 urge	 radical	 changes	 to	 the	 treatment	 of	
justice-involved	 youth.	 First	 and	 foremost,	 grass-roots	 organizations	
have	pursued	the	abolition	of	juvenile-life-without-parole	(JLWOP)	and	
other	 extreme	 juvenile	 sentences.139	 In	 addition,	 citing	 the	 “kids	 are	
different”	 rationale	 of	 these	 cases,140	 scholars	 have	 argued	 for	 re-
examination	of	juvenile	transfer	laws	and	for	conditions	of	confinement	
that	 reflect	 young	 people’s	 vulnerability	 and	 unique	 capacity	 for	
rehabilitation.141	 The	 juvenile	 defense	 bar	 now	 recognizes	 that,	when	
minors	face	a	potential	life	sentence,	it	is	tantamount	to	a	capital	trial	for	
youth,	 and	 there	 are	 specific,	 articulated	 standards	 for	 this	 kind	 of	
representation.142	 Juvenile	 advocates	 have	 challenged	 sex-offender	
registration	 requirements	 for	 minors,	 arguing	 that	 lifetime	 registry	
violates	the	logic	and	rationale	of	the	Miller	trilogy.143	Finally,	citing	the	


































ban	 the	 sentence,	 while	 another	 five	 states	 have	 no	 one	 serving	
JLWOP.147	 Moreover,	 as	 recently	 as	 2015,	 nine	 states	 automatically	
charged	 seventeen-year-olds	 in	 adult	 court	 and	 two	 states	 routinely	










state	 changes	 in	 sentencing	 and	 parole	 laws.152	 This	 is	 remarkable	
change	in	a	short	period	of	time.	
And	yet,	Miller’s	implementation	has	neither	been	straightforward	
nor	 has	 it	 been	 consistent	 across	 the	 country.	 To	 begin,	 many	 state	
courts	and	legislatures	were	hesitant	to	adopt	meaningful	changes	in	the	
early	 aftermath	 of	Graham	 and	Miller.153	 At	 the	 same	 time,	while	 the	








	 148.	 Maurice	Chammah,	The	17-Year-Old	Adults,	 THE	MARSHALL	PROJECT	 (June	3,	2015),	https:
//www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/03/the-17-year-old-adults.	
	 149.	 Anne	Teigen,	Juvenile	Age	of	Jurisdiction	and	Transfer	to	Adult	Court,	NAT’L	CONF.	STATE	LEGS.	






















sentenced	 to	 JLWOP,	 the	 parole	 process	 is	 often	 hollow	 and	
meaningless.158	 For	 example,	 despite	 his	 victory	 before	 the	 Supreme	
Court,	Henry	Montgomery	himself	was	 recently	denied	parole	 for	 the	
second	time	even	though,	at	seventy-two,	he	has	served	fifty-five	years	
and	 has	 an	 impeccable	 improvement	 in	 his	 correctional	 record.159	
Finally,	despite	 the	success	with	campaigns	to	“raise	 the	age”	of	adult	
court	jurisdiction	as	a	default	matter,	transfer	laws	remain	ubiquitous	
and	 often	 unchecked	 by	 judicial	 oversight,	 and	 youth	 continue	 to	 be	
housed	 in	 adult	 correctional	 facilities.160	 In	 short,	 advocates	 have	
leveraged	 the	Miller	 trilogy	 to	 seek	 ambitious	 reforms,	 but	 enormous	




in	 2016,	 in	which	 the	 Court	 found	Miller	 retroactively	 applicable,	 the	
Court	has	appeared	reticent	to	expand	the	scope	of	the	Miller	trilogy	and	
deferential	 in	 matters	 of	Miller’s	 implementation.161	 For	 example,	 as	
discussed	above,	courts	are	split	on	 the	question	of	how	to	handle	de	
facto	life	sentences	or	life	sentences	that	result	from	aggregate	term-of-
year	 sentences,	 and	 the	 Court	 has	 refused	 to	 squarely	 address	 those	
issues.162	At	the	same	time,	the	science	on	which	the	Miller	trilogy	relied	
	




Are	Fighting	Back,	 THE	APPEAL	 (May	23,	2019),	 https://theappeal.org/d-c-offers-hope-to-people-
who-committed-crimes-as-children-but-prosecutors-are-fighting-back/.	
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The	 Supreme	 Court	 held	 that	 Virginia’s	 decision	 was	 not	 an	
unreasonable	application	of	Graham.168	Thus,	the	Court	appears	to	have	
no	appetite	either	 for	vigorously	enforcing	 the	mandates	of	 the	Miller	
trilogy	or	for	expanding	its	core	holdings.	
At	the	same	time,	Justice	Kennedy	was	a	driving	force	behind	the	
Court’s	 examination	 of	 extreme	 juvenile	 sentences169	 and	 a	 vocal	
opponent	 of	 broader	 American	 criminal	 justice	 practices.170	 With	 his	
departure	and	the	establishment	of	a	solid	conservative	majority	on	the	
Supreme	 Court,171	 juvenile	 justice	 advocates	 can	 expect	 diminishing	
	
17-912).	Under	state	law,	he	was	to	become	parole-eligible	at	the	age	of	112.	Bostic	argued	that	his	
sentence	was	 barred	 by	Graham	 v.	 Florida,	 and	 yet	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 declined	 to	 answer	 the	

















Bar	 Ass’n	 Annual	 Mtg.	 (Aug.	 9,	 2003)	 (transcript	 at	 https://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html)	 (addressing	 scale,	 discrimination,	 and	 unfairness	 of	
American	corrections).	












to	 a	 resentencing	 hearing	 at	 which	 his	 youth	 and	 other	 mitigating	






to	 retroactive	 relief.178	As	Malvo’s	attorneys	pointed	out	 in	 their	brief	
opposing	certiorari,	there	is	no	widespread	confusion	regarding	Miller’s	
application,	and	a	majority	of	courts	have	already	concluded	that	Miller	
applies	 to	 both	 mandatory	 and	 discretionary	 life-without-parole	
sentences	 imposed	 on	 juveniles.179	 Further,	 as	 Malvo	 argued,	
Montgomery	 and	Miller	made	clear	 that	 juvenile	 life-without-parole	 is	
only	 constitutional	 when	 imposed	 upon	 “the	 rare	 juvenile	 offender	
whose	crime	reflects	irreparable	corruption,”180	and	no	court	has	made	
that	determination	in	Malvo’s	case.	In	sum,	given	the	new	composition	
of	 the	 Court,	 there	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 expect	 diminished	 procedural	
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despair.	 In	 fact,	 there	 may	 be	 a	 silver	 lining	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	
examination	of	Gault	at	fifty.	Gault	at	fifty	serves	as	a	reminder	of	how	
modest	the	Supreme	Court’s	capacity	for	criminal	justice	reform	really	




However,	 this	 need	 not	 necessarily	 be	 true	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
Miller	trilogy.	To	the	extent	that	state	legislative	bodies	are	the	engines	
of	 criminal	 justice	 reform,	 those	 engines	 can	drive	 reform	 that	 either	
expands	or	contracts	the	rights	of	justice-involved	youth.184	And	there	is	
good	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 today,	unlike	 in	 the	1970s,	 state	 legislators	
may	 be	 receptive	 to	 ongoing	 juvenile	 justice	 reform.	 Crime	 rates	
continue	to	be	historically	low,185	and	juvenile	arrests	are	similarly	low	
as	compared	to	their	peak	in	the	1990s.186	States	have	already	moved	
toward	 reducing	 reliance	 on	 incarceration	 for	 kids,	 and	 juvenile	











	 184.	 PEW	 CHARITABLE	 TRUSTS,	 33	 States	 Reform	 Criminal	 Justice	 Policies	 Through	 Justice	
Reinvestment	(Nov.	2016),	https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/08/33_states_refor
m_criminal_justice_policies_through_justice_reinvestment.pdf	(describing	the	array	of	state	reform	
laws	 designed	 to	 reduce	 correctional	 populations	 and	 improve	 public	 safety	 in	 33	 states	 since	
2007).	





	 187.	 Trends	 in	 Juvenile	 Incarceration,	 CHILD	TRENDS,	https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/
juvenile-detention	 (last	 visited	 Dec.	 30,	 2019)	 (demonstrating	 that	 the	 number	 of	 youth	 in	
detention	in	2015	was	less	than	half	what	it	had	been	in	1997).	












a	 tremendous	 gap	 between	 the	 procedural	 rights	 announced	 by	 the	
Gault	 Court	 and	 the	 reality	 of	 those	 rights	 for	 youth.	 However,	 this	




legislative	 bodies.	 Just	 as	 the	 states	 implemented	 measures	 that	
hindered	the	vision	of	the	Gault	Court,	today	state	lawmakers	can	correct	
the	 course	 of	 juvenile	 justice	 and	 perhaps	make	 possible	 the	Warren	
Court’s	procedural	ideals	in	the	process.	In	the	wake	of	the	Court’s	more	
recent	Miller	trilogy,	a	majority	of	states	have	now	banned	the	sentence	
of	 JLWOP,	 and	 states	 should	 continue	 the	 march	 toward	 national	
abolition.	But	states	can	and	should	go	further.190	They	should	return	to	
the	Gault-era	 default	 of	 prosecuting	 youth	 in	 juvenile	 court	 and	 once	
again	make	 it	 difficult	 and	 rare	 for	 youth	 to	 be	 tried	 as	 adults.	 They	
should	abolish	mandatory	minimums	as	applied	to	juveniles	and	ensure	
that	youth	 in	 its	own	right	 is	always	a	relevant,	mitigating	variable	at	
sentencing.	 They	 should	 acknowledge	 that	 incarceration	 has	 a	
criminogenic	effect	on	kids	and	make	every	effort	 to	keep	kids	out	of	
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